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Resumen
En este documento se estudian los efectos de devaluaciones reales sobre el producto usando
una muestra de fuertes devaluaciones reales para un grupo de países emergentes y
desarrollados. Se encuentra que los efectos de hoja de balance, capturados por la interacción
entre la devaluación real y el nivel de endeudamiento externo del país, tienen un efecto
negativo y significativo sobre el producto. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, existe evidencia de
un efecto positivo de la devaluación real asociada al efecto expansivo tradicional. Para países
con un nivel de deuda externa en moneda extranjera elevado, la devaluación real será
probablemente contractiva en el corto plazo, aunque estos efectos pueden ser revertido en el
mediano plazo. Finalmente, países con mercados financieros más desarrollados experimentan
menores pérdidas de producto a continuación de la devaluación.
Abstract
In this paper I study the effects of real exchange rate devaluations on output performance
using a sample of large devaluation episodes for a group of emerging and developed
countries. I find that balance sheet effects, captured by the interaction between the real
exchange rate devaluation and the level of external indebtedness of the country, have a
significant and negative impact on output. Nevertheless, there is also evidence of a positive
effect of the real devaluation associated to the traditional expansionary effect. For countries
with large foreign-denominated external debt, the combined effect of the real exchange rate
depreciation is likely to generate significant output losses in the short-run. However, in the
medium term, the expansionary effect of the real devaluation tends to dominate the balance
sheet effect, which implies a positive effect on output in the medium term. Finally, countries
with deeper financial market experience lower output losses following a devaluation.
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After a series of massive devaluations in East Asian countries in the period
1997-1998, that were followed by severe output losses, a number of authors
questioned the possibility of using the exchange rate as a shock absorber.
Despite the fact that a devaluation of the exchange rate could have been
eﬀective in generating a necessary change in relative prices, balance sheet
eﬀects on ﬁrms and banks, associated to the devaluations, were pointed out
as the causes behind output and investment collapses. Balance sheet eﬀects
may play a crucial role in the transmission of a devaluation on the economy
if aggregate demand is constrained by the net worth of agents1,a n di fac o n -
siderable amount of the borrowing that these agents have obtained has been
denominated in foreign currency. In this case, by weakening the economy’s
balance sheet, a devaluation ampliﬁes the eﬀect of ﬁnancial frictions, pushing
down aggregate demand, output and employment. Therefore, and in contrast
with the conventional wisdom, a devaluation is potentially contractionary.
Recent theoretical work has shown that, despite the negative eﬀects asso-
ciated to a devaluation due to the dollarization of liabilities problem, it seems
likely that a ﬂexible exchange regime still plays an insulating role when fac-
ing an external shock. Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2003, 2004), Gertler,
Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) and Devereux and Lane (2003), among oth-
ers, have constructed models for small open economies where balance sheets
of ﬁrms play an explicit role. They show that even when balance sheet ef-
fects are present, ﬂexible exchange rates may still perform better than ﬁxed
regimes in terms of output losses when adjusting to negative external shocks.
The logic is simple, net worth depends not only on debt repayments but on
return on capital. Fixed regimes defend the peg by increasing interest rates.
However, this increase reduces output and the return on capital generating a
1For example, due to informational frictions in the borrowing process as emphasized
by Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
1negative eﬀect on net worth. However, these authors also show that there are
situations in which the contractionary eﬀect of the devaluation dominates.
In particular, Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2003) show that a situation in
which the negative balance sheet eﬀects dominate the competitiveness eﬀect
is more likely when the ﬁnancial markets are less developed, the ratio of total
debt to net worth is high and the share of dollar debt in total debt is high.
Now, if ﬁnancial frictions are not “too severe” or ﬁnancial markets are more
developed, and the level of indebtedness of the economy is not “too high”, a
less pronounced fall in net worth under a devaluation is likely to occur when
an adverse shock hits the economy. In these cases, devaluations are likely to
be expansionary.
In this paper I address the eﬀects of real exchange rate devaluations on
output performance empirically. For this purpose, I use a sample of large
devaluation episodes for a group of emerging and developed countries that
took place in the last 25 years. In particular, I study the evolution of GDP
growth during the ﬁr s tt w oy e a r sa f t e rt h ed e v a l u a t i o n .Iﬁnd that balance
sheet eﬀects, captured by the interaction between the real exchange rate
devaluation and the level of external indebtedness of the country, have a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on output. But there is also a positive eﬀect of the
real devaluation on output associated to the traditional expansionary eﬀect
of the devaluation. This expansionary eﬀect is less signiﬁcant in explaining
the evolution of output growth during the ﬁrst year after the devaluation.
However, it is a signiﬁcant determinant of output growth during the second
year following the devaluation. Therefore, my results indicate that policy
makers in countries with external borrowing in foreign currency may face a
policy dilemma. If they allow the exchange rate to depreciate, they are likely
to suﬀer signiﬁcant output losses in the short-run. Nevertheless, it is also
likely that the real depreciation will generate a positive eﬀect on output in
the medium term. I also ﬁnd that the deepness of the ﬁnancial markets is
an important determinant of the evolution of output after such devaluation.
2In particular, countries with deeper ﬁnancial market experience lower output
losses following a devaluation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical evidence
regarding the eﬀects of exchange rate devaluations on output. Section 3
provides the theoretical framework in which this paper is based on. Section 4
contains a description of the main variables included in the empirical analysis.
In section 5 the evidence found is presented, and section 6 concludes.
2R e v i e w o f l i t e r a t u r e
There are several channels through which exchange rate devaluations may af-
fect negatively output stressed by previous theoretical literature on contrac-
tionary devaluations. A devaluation may aﬀect aggregate demand negatively
because it triggers an income distribution from high marginal propensity to
consume to low marginal propensity to consume as in Díaz-Alejandro (1963)
and Krugman and Taylor (1978). If investment depends on the real exchange
rate because in order to produce capital ﬁrms need to import capital goods
from abroad, a depreciation of the exchange rate increase the cost of pro-
ducing capital, when measured in terms of the foreign good, and therefore
decrease investment and aggregate demand. Additionally, a devaluation may
reduce aggregate demand if the trade balance is in deﬁcit as imported goods
become more expensive (Krugman and Taylor (1978)). A devaluation may
also reduce output through its negative impact on aggregate supply. By in-
creasing the cost of imported inputs and therefore the costs of production, a
devaluation reduces aggregate supply. Finally, if the increase in demand for
labor from the beneﬁted tradable sector pushes wages up, there could be a
negative eﬀect on aggregate supply.
The empirical literature on the eﬀects of devaluations on output tends to
be mixed and has been concentrated mainly in the eﬀects of devaluations on
output for developing countries. Cooper (1971) shows that the contractionary
3eﬀects of devaluations tend to be signiﬁcant but they have only short run
eﬀects. Consistent with these previous results, Edwards (1986) shows that
devaluations generate a small contractionary eﬀect on output in the ﬁrst year
after the devaluation. However, this negative eﬀect is completely reversed by
the second year. Therefore, in his analysis, devaluations are neutral in the
long run. These results are obtained using a set of controls for other possible
determinants of output growth. Recently, Magendzo (2002) has argued that
the fact that devaluations are found to be contractionary in previous studies
is related to the fact that the same variables that determine the probability
of a devaluation determine the rate of growth of output. He ﬁnds that after
controlling for a selection bias problem, the contractionary eﬀects of previous
studies disappear, devaluations are found to be neither contractionary nor
expansionary.
Using a sample of currency crisis episodes for 91 developing economies,
Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001) show that in a signiﬁcant fraction, crises
are associated with higher output. Larger and more developed countries
tend to suﬀer more in terms of output following a currency crises. Among
the factors that explain the severity of the crisis are capital inﬂows previous to
t h ec r i s i s ,o i lp r i c e s ,a n dt h ee v o l u t i o no ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ei nt r a d ep a r t n e r s .
Recently, Hutchinson and Noy (2004) investigate the determinants of output
losses following a currency and banking crisis. They show that currency
and banking crises have signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of output performance
o nat w o - f o u ry e a rp e r i o d . T h e yd on o tﬁnd that the interaction eﬀects
between currency and banking crises exacerbate output losses. De Gregorio
and Lee (2004) ﬁnd that among the main determinants of output losses for
a sample of East Asian and Latin American countries are external factors,
as measured by trade partner’s GDP growth, and the level of international
reserves previous to the currency crisis. They also ﬁnd that expansionary
monetary policy and the exchange rate devaluation have positive eﬀects on
output. Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri, and Roubini (2002) present some evidence,
4using a sample of 23 devaluation episodes for a group of middle income and
developed countries in the nineties, that indicates that countries with initial
high levels of foreign debt tend to suﬀer exchange rate devaluations that go
beyond the equilibrium devaluation. This overshooting of the exchange rate
is associated to larger output losses when interacting with the initial level of
external debt.
A recent contribution to the literature of exchange rate devaluations and
macroeconomic performance using micro-level data is the work of Bleakley
and Cowan (2002). They investigate empirically the consequences on invest-
ment of holding foreign currency denominated debt during a exchange rate
realignment using a sample of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms from Latin American coun-
tries. They ﬁnd that the competitiveness eﬀect of the devaluation dominates
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect associated to increases in debt service due to debt de-
nomination or net-worth eﬀect. Several studies that have followed this work,
using also micro-level data, tend to conﬁrm Bleakley and Cowan’s results.
Another work that investigates empirically the role played by balance
sheets, this time not in output but in the country risk premium, is the one
by Berganza, Chang and García-Herrero (2004). Using country risk premium
data for a sample of twenty seven emerging countries provided by JP Morgan
(EMBI), they ﬁnd robust evidence in favor of negative balance sheets eﬀects,
measured by the interaction between the real exchange rate and the level of
indebtedness, on country risk premium. These negative eﬀects are driven by
countries with larger ﬁnancial imperfections.
3 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework used in this paper is closely related to the work
of Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (CCV) (2003, 2004), Devereux and Lane
(2003), Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003), and Choi and Cook (2004).
The basic idea is that the existence of ﬁnancial frictions make balance sheets
5play a central role in the transmission of external shocks. In particular, con-
sider the case of a small open economy for whom the risk premium that
domestic ﬁrms (or banks) have to pay in order to borrow abroad is deter-
mined endogenously by their net worth, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
A higher level of debt with respect to net worth, tends to amplify the neg-
ative eﬀect of a devaluation on investment, output and employment when
debt contracts are denominated in foreign currency. Additionally, a more
ﬁnancially developed market tends to reduce the eﬀects of the devaluation
on aggregate demand by making the conditions of borrowing (risk premium),
less sensitive to changes in net worth.2
As stressed by CCV (2004), despite the potential negative balance sheet
eﬀects, devaluations of the exchange rate may still play an insulating role in
the presence of external shocks. The logic behind this is simple. Net worth
also depends on output, which is stabilized through the standard Mundell-
Fleming mechanism. In summary, as indicated by CCV (2003), the ﬁnal
result will depend on the structural parameters and initial conditions of the
economy. In particular, they show that a devaluation may be contractionary
if:
• the ﬁnancial markets are less developed.
• the ratio of total debt to net worth is high.
• the share of dollar debt in total debt is high.
In a related family of models that stress the role of collateral in the
provision of credit, Christiano, Gust and Roldós (2004) show that under a
certain set of conditions, a cut in interest rate is optimal when facing an
exogenous tightening in the collateral constraint (identiﬁed as a ﬁnancial
crisis). These conditions include substantial substitution possibilities among
factors of production and not strong diminishing returns. In this model, if
2See Céspedes (2001)
6t h et r a d a b l es e c t o ri sa b l et oa b s o r br e s o u r c e sf r o mt h en o n - t r a d a b l es e c t o r
rapidly, an expansionary policy following a ﬁnancial crisis, or a devaluation
of the exchange rate, may be the optimal response.
Recently Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri, and Roubini (2002) show that in the
presence of a margin constraint on the domestic country, a devaluation may
have signiﬁcant negative eﬀe c t so nd o m e s t i co u t p u tf o rc o u n t r i e sw i t hh i g h
levels of debt. By reducing the value of domestic assets with respect to inter-
national liabilities, the devaluation increases the probability of making the
margin constraint binding and, therefore, the probability of ﬁr es a l e st h a te x -
acerbates the negative eﬀects on wealth and activity. They argue that ﬁxed
regimes may dominate ﬂexible regimes by avoiding the damaging exchange
rate overshooting. Mendoza and Smith (2002) construct a model where col-
lateral constraints, also modelled in the form of margin requirements, and
asset trading costs are introduced in a standard small open economy. They
show that when the debt-equity ratio is high, productivity shocks of the
same magnitude that drive a regular business cycle may generate large cur-
rent account reversals and collapses in consumption through its eﬀects in
asset prices.
In this paper I use the interaction eﬀect between the real exchange rate
and the external debt to capture the balance sheet eﬀects associated to the
devaluation when external debt is denominated in terms of a foreign currency.
This interaction will determine the size of the contractionary eﬀect of the de-
valuation on output. By taking advantage of the cross sectional diﬀerences in
the levels of debt, the interaction term between the size of the devaluation and
the external debt should capture the balance sheet eﬀects associated to the
devaluation, while an additional term for the exchange rate should capture
the competitiveness eﬀect of the devaluation on output, which is associated
to the ability of the economy to move resources from the non-tradable sector
to the tradable one or the ability of the exportable sector increase production
in response to the devaluation. The following speciﬁcation aim to capture
7these elements:
∆Yj = α0 + α1∆Ej + α2∆Ej × (DEBTj)+
α3PROFj + Xjβ +  j (1)
where ∆Yj i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fo u t p u ta f t e rt h ed e v a l u a t i o ne p i s o d ej,
∆Ej is the real exchange rate depreciation (with a positive value reﬂecting
a devaluation), DEBTj is the level of external indebtedness of the economy
at the moment of the devaluation, PROF j is the level of development in the
ﬁnancial market (a higher value implies a more developed ﬁnancial market),
and Xj is a row vector of other control variables that have been stressed in
previous works on output losses after large devaluations.3
As can be inferred from the previous equation, the eﬀect of the real ex-
change devaluation may be positive or negative. Taking a partial derivative
of ∆Yi with respect to the real devaluation we obtain:
∂∆Yj
∂∆Ej
= α1 + α2(DEBTj) (2)
The expected sign for α1 is positive. For α2,w ee x p e c tt h es i g nt ob e
negative. Are devaluations expansionary in terms of output or investment?
The answer to this question will depend on the sign of the partial derivative.
If the sign of
∂∆Yi
∂∆Ei is positive (negative), we refer to this as an expansionary
(contractionary) devaluation.
3At this point it is worth mentioning a conceptual diﬀerence between my work and the
one by Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri, and Roubini (2002) beyond the diﬀerence in the samples
under analysis. Their work is based on the existence of a margin constraint on the domestic
economy. When this constraint is hit, ﬁre sales of domestic assets cause an overshooting of
t h ee x c h a n g er a t et h a tg e n e r a t e ss t r o n gw e a l t he ﬀect through balance sheets. Therefore,
they center their analysis in the role played by the overshooting of the real exchange rate.
Here, I am interested in the total eﬀect of the real devaluation on output as the ﬁnancial
constrain is always binding. Moreover, I decompose this eﬀect into two diﬀerent eﬀects: a
competitiveness one and a contractionary eﬀect.
8Distinguishing the cases when a devaluation may be contractionary or
expansionary is at this point an empirical task. In the following, I test the
main implications of the theoretical framework here presented and, with the
empirical results at hand, I test how relevant the arguments against monetary
policy independence can be.
4 Data description
I center my analysis on a sample of 82 large devaluation episodes for a set
of middle income and developed countries occurred in the period 1980-2001.
This strategy leaves out of the analysis an important amount of episodes of
large devaluations in low income countries. I do this for two reasons. First,
balance sheet eﬀects are likely to be a relevant phenomenon for developed
and middle income economies. Low income countries tend to suﬀer credit
rationing and ﬁnancial repression. Under these conditions, the transmission
mechanism is diﬀerent from the one discussed in this paper. Despite not
considering low income country devaluation episodes in the analysis, the
number of episodes used in the empirical estimation is similar to previous
studies. The second reason for concentrating in large devaluation episodes is
that, as previous studies report, it is precisely during these episodes that the
contractionary eﬀects of real devaluations tend to be stronger.4 As in Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Frankel and Rose (1996), I consider those
cases in which the nominal depreciation during the ﬁrst year following the
devaluation is greater than 15% and it is not reversed in the year immediately
after.
In order to make my results comparable with previous empirical litera-
ture on output losses after a devaluation, I initially study the evolution of
average output growth, with respect to its trend growth, during the ﬁrst and
4See Rajan and Shen (2002) and Berganza, Chang and García-Herrero (2004).
9second years following the initial devaluation.5 I use two measures for the
real exchange rate. In the ﬁrst case, and as in previous empirical studies on
contractionary devaluations (see for example Edwards (1986)), I use a real
exchange rate index constructed as the nominal exchange rate with respect
to the U.S. dollar times the ratio of the U.S. CPI index relative to the do-
mestic CPI index. The second proxy used in the empirical analysis is the real
eﬀective exchange rate taken from the World Development Indicators. In the
case of middle income countries, most of the foreign borrowing is denomi-
nated in terms of U.S. dollars which justify the use of the real exchange rate
v i sav i st h eU . S .i no r d e rt oc a p t u r et h eb a l a n c es h e e te ﬀects. Nevertheless,
the competitiveness eﬀect may be better captured by the evolution of the
real eﬀective exchange rate that corresponds to the value of each currency
against a weighted average of several foreign currencies where the weights
reﬂect the relative importance of each of the other countries in trade ﬂows.
For this reason I use both measures in my analysis.
A key variable in the analysis is the level of external indebtedness of the
economy. For emerging economies the data comes from the World Bank
database and corresponds to the total external debt with respect to GDP.
For the case of developed countries, I use the data reported by the IMF-
BIS on external assets and liabilities to construct their net external debt
position.6 This variable is diﬀerent from the one reported by the World
5In the cases in which quarterly data is not available, I use the rate of growth of output
of the year in which the devaluation occurred for those that occurred in the ﬁrst half of
the year and the year following the devaluation for those occurred in the second half of
the year. The trend growth rate of output corresponds to the average growth previous to
the devaluation.
6Net external debt for developed countries is deﬁned as debt securities liabilities and
other investment liabilities minus debt securities assets and other investment assets. For
some developed countries this data is not available from the IMF-BIS database for the
1980’s. In those cases, I use Milesi-Ferretti and Lane’s database. The main potential con-
sistency problem when using Milesi-Ferretti and Lane’s database is the fact that portfolio
investment assets and liabilities are not separated between equity and debt. As portfolio
10Bank for developing countries as includes the external asset position of the
country. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence between these two concepts (external
and net debt) is of lesser importance due to the fact that the total amount of
external assets of the developing countries in the sample is not considerable.7
Another key variable in the empirical analysis, that has been stressed in
the imperfect ﬁnancial markets literature, is the degree of ﬁnancial devel-
opment. In order to account for the ﬁnancial markets deepness, I use two
diﬀerent measures. The ﬁrst one corresponds to the rule of law index as in
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1997). This index is an
assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the
country-risk rating agency International Country Risk. Higher values for
the index imply deeper ﬁnancial markets.8 Additionally, I use as a proxy
to measure deepness in the ﬁnancial markets corresponds to the total credit
extended to the private sector by ﬁnancial intermediaries as a percentage of
GDP. As Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) argue, this variable should tend to
reﬂect higher level of ﬁnancial services and therefore a more robust ﬁnancial
system. Higher values for these indexes should dampen the negative eﬀects
of devaluations as the imperfections in the ﬁnancial markets are less binding.
Finally, the remaining group of variables used in the empirical analysis are
expected to reﬂect the impact of external conditions on output performance.
Three are the main variables used for this purpose: the rate of growth of
commercial partners, the terms of trade and the real interest rate in the
US.9 Controlling for these factors is key in the empirical implementation in
order to distinguish the eﬀects of these shocks on output performance from
equity investment has become a prominent component of this portfolio investment only
since the 1990’s, this should not be of major importance.
7In fact, this is the case for those cases in which there is data available to made the
comparison.
8As shown by La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1998), this rule of law index is consis-
tently related to deeper ﬁnancial markets after controlling for GDP level, and legal origin.
9All of them with respect to their sample average.
11the eﬀect of the exchange rate. This is especially relevant, as discussed by
Edwards (1986), given the fact that the actual exchange rate devaluation
may be (in part) endogenous to the magnitude of the external shock that the
economy faces. In this case, not controlling for external factors may bias the
coeﬃcient associated to the exchange rate in the regression analysis.10
5 Empirical Results
The ﬁrst step in the empirical implementation is the estimation of equation
1 using OLS (see table 1). The ﬁrst result that emerges from the empirical
analysis under this speciﬁcation is that the coeﬃcient associated to the inter-
action between the real exchange rate and the level of external indebtedness
is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating the presence of strong balance sheet
eﬀects. Also, there is no evidence of a competitiveness eﬀect associated to
the real exchange rate term. Additionally, countries with deeper ﬁnancial
markets, proxied by the rule of law index, experience lower output losses fol-
lowing the devaluation. External factors, represented by the terms of trade,
the GDP growth of commercial partners and the world interest rate, play a
signiﬁcant role explaining the evolution of output.
An additional measure used in the empirical literature to proxy for ﬁnan-
cial deepness is the credit provided to the private sector as a percentage of
GDP. When I use this measured instead of the rule of law index, the results
do not change signiﬁcantly with the exception of the signiﬁcance of the ﬁ-
nancial deepness proxy itself. This result should not be surprising as many
of these devaluation episodes were preceded by credit booms that did not
necessarily imply deeper ﬁnancial markets.11 I prefer using the rule of law
10I avoid using domestic variables in the analysis, other than the real exchange rate,
as independent variables to reduce simultaneity problems. Regarding the potential endo-
geneity of the real exchange rate, I will explicitly address this issue in the next section.
11See Gourinchas, Landerretche and Valdés (2001).
12index as a measure of ﬁnancial deepness because as it has been documented
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) this variable is
highly correlated with broader indicators of ﬁnancial deepness for both debt
and equity markets.12 Finally, the degree of openness of the economy and
the reversal in capital ﬂows, commonly used in this type of studies, are not
found signiﬁcant.
A second proxy for the real exchange rate used in this paper is the real
eﬀective exchange rate. This measure, in contrast to the previous one that
corresponds to a bilateral real rate with respect to the U.S., is a weighted
average of several currencies where the weights reﬂect the relative impor-
tance of each of the other countries in trade ﬂows. Nevertheless, the results
obtained from this speciﬁcation are consistent with the previous ones.
One potential problem with the previous estimations is that the exchange
rate devaluation could be correlated with some omitted variable and there-
fore, may not be a completely exogenous variable. In this case, not only
the real exchange rate would be endogenous but also its interaction with the
level of external indebtedness.13 In order to solve this potential simultaneity
problem, I use a three-stage least square procedure. The instruments used
included all the exogenous variables in the previous estimations plus lags of
the misalignment of the real exchange rate, lags of the rate of devaluation
and the level of external indebtedness. Additionally, products and square
roots of these variables are used as additional instruments for the interaction
term between the real exchange rate and external debt.
The new estimations indicate that once we control for the simultaneity
problem, the elasticity of the interaction term between the real exchange
rate and the external debt is approximately two times larger than in the
12Also, this index is available for all the countries in my sample.
13In fact, Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results indicate that this is the case for the esti-
mations presented in tables 1 and 2. Therefore, the estimates obtained by least squares
would not be consistent.
13previous estimations (see tables 3 and 4).14 In the case of the estimations in
which I use the real eﬀective exchange rate, I ﬁnd that the competitiveness
eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, despite
h a v i n gan e g a t i v ee ﬀect through balance sheets, the real devaluation has
a positive eﬀect on activity. Real devaluations could be contractionary or
expansionary depending on the size of external debt. Economies with large
external debt are likely to experience a contractionary devaluations as our
theoretical framework would predict. Again, the level of ﬁnancial deepness
has the expected sign and is signiﬁcant in most of the speciﬁcations.15
So far I have assumed that all the external debt is denominated in terms
of foreign currencies. In order to check how signiﬁcant these results are to
relaxing this assumption, I use a variable constructed by Hausmann and
Panizza (2002) on foreign debt currency denomination. Using data on in-
ternational debt securities from the Bank of International Settlements, they
construct an index that measures the percentage of international securities
that a country issue in foreign currency. If a country issues all its external
debt in foreign currency this index take a value equal to 1. It turns out that
this assumption is reasonably good for middle income countries. However,
for developed countries it may overestimate the amount of “relevant” lia-
bilities. Unfortunately, this data on external debt denomination is available
only starting in 1993. Nevertheless, I will proceed assuming that the external
debt denomination during the nineties was similar to the one in the eighties.
T a b l e5p r e s e n t st h er e s u l t sw h e na ni n t e r a c t i o nt e r ma m o n gt h er e a l
exchange rate devaluation, the external debt and an index of the fraction
of external debt denominated in foreign currency is used in the estimations.
The results tend to conﬁrm my previous ﬁndings.
14The J-tests for overidentifying restrictions indicate that the set of instrument I have
used in the analysis are appropriate in the sense that are not correlated with the error
term of the GDP growth equation.
15However, for the estimations in which I use the ratio of domestic credit to GDP as
the proxy for ﬁnancial deepness, this variable is not signiﬁcant.
14T h ep r e v i o u ss p e c i ﬁc a t i o n sh a v ea sad e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l et h ea v e r a g ee v o -
lution of GDP in the two years after the devaluation with respect to the GDP
growth average in previous years. How are the results aﬀected if we run re-
gressions for output growth during the ﬁrst and second year separately? It
turns out that the eﬀects of real devaluations on output through the com-
petitiveness and balance sheet eﬀects seem to depend on the time horizon.
In the ﬁrst place, the evolution of output during the ﬁrst year seems to be
explained by the interaction eﬀect between the real devaluation and the ex-
ternal debt, but there is no evidence of a competitiveness eﬀect operating
on output during the ﬁrst year after the devaluation. Additionally, the only
external variable signiﬁcantly explaining the evolution of output during the
ﬁrst year is the evolution of commercial partner growth. The terms of trade
and the world interest rate were not found to be signiﬁcant determinants of
output growth in these estimations.16
Regarding the estimations for the evolution of output during the second
year after the devaluation, the coeﬃcient associated to the balance sheet
eﬀect of the real devaluation is found to be signiﬁcant while the competitive-
ness eﬀect is also signiﬁcant not only for the estimation that uses the real
eﬀective exchange rate, as in previous estimations, but also for the estimation
that uses the real exchange rate vis a vis the U.S..17 This evidence indicates
that the competitiveness eﬀect tends to take some time to operate, which
is in line with previous results.18 Finally, all the external factors included
in this estimation are signiﬁcant explanatory variables for the evolution of
output during the second year.
In order to check if the previous results may be capturing other diﬀer-
16Including lags for the external controls do not alter these results.
17J-tests for endogeneity of the real exchange rate for these estimations do not reject
the null of no endogeneity. Therefore, I also report OLS estimates for the estimations
explaining the evolution of output during the second year after the devaluation as these
estimates should be more eﬃcient.
18See Edwards (1986).
15ences between developed and middle income countries, I excluded from the
estimations the European countries in the sample. The results obtained from
this strategy indicate that the balance sheet and competitiveness eﬀects seem
to be robust within developed and middle income economies (see table 6).
The phenomenon of dollarization used in this paper is one corresponding
to the denomination of external debt. However, domestic ﬁnancial mar-
kets, for the countries in the sample, may also be dollarized.19 In this case
the real devaluation not only aﬀects the economy because external debt is
denominated in foreign currency, but also because domestic liabilities are
denominated in terms of a foreign currency while presumably an important
fraction of income is generated in domestic currency. In order to assess how
important this eﬀect may be, I use a proxy for domestic dollarization that
measures the fraction of domestic loans provided by the ﬁnancial system that
is denominated in foreign currency. Unfortunately this series is only avail-
able for half of the episodes in the sample, however, some useful insights can
be obtained. In particular, I ﬁnd that the degree of domestic dollarization
is a signiﬁcant explanatory variable for the evolution of output during the
year of the devaluation. Countries that exhibit higher degrees of domestic
dollarization tend to suﬀer higher output losses.
The next robustness check that I performed consists in evaluating if the
results change when controlling for the exchange rate regime in place at the
moment of the devaluation. In particular, I estimate if the results are diﬀer-
ent when considering only countries with less ﬂexible exchange rate system.20
No major changes to my previous results are obtained. One possible expla-
nation for this is that the importance of the exchange rate regime is already
captured by one of the variables that I use as instrument in my regressions:
the misalignment of the real exchange rate. If more rigid regimes suﬀer
19See Savastano (1992, 1996).
20Less ﬂexible regimes include de jure pegged and intermediate regimes from Ghosh,
Gulde and Wolf (2002).
16larger misalignments of the real exchange rate previous to the devaluation,
the eﬀect of the exchange rate system will be reﬂected on the size of the real
devaluation. Additionally, the exchange rate regime may have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the decisions of hedging made by private agents. A ﬁxed regime may
increase the desirability of borrowing in foreign currency even for ﬁrms whose
income is not linked to this foreign currency in order to take advantage of
lower and more stable interest rates. Part of this eﬀect should be reﬂected is
reﬂected by the fraction of debt denominated in foreign currency, especially
in the case of the estimations that use a proxy for domestic dollarization.
Some authors have stressed that the output losses associated to currency
crisis may be augmented if a banking crisis occurs at the same time.21 In
order to avoid simultaneity problems, I introduce in my analysis a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if a banking crisis occurred in the year
previous to the year of the devaluation episode. My results indicate that
countries that experienced (or were experiencing) a banking crisis previously
to the devaluation endured higher output losses. A banking crisis reduces
output growth between 1.5 and 2% in annual terms.
Taking advantage of the fact that endogeneity tests do not reject the
hypothesis of no endogeneity of the real exchange rate in the estimation of
output growth during the second year after the devaluation, I am able to
do some computations in order to determine the total eﬀect of the exchange
rate devaluation on output performance during the second year after the
devaluation.22 The eﬀect of the real exchange rate devaluation on output
performance for country (or episode) j will be given by:
21See for example Hutchison and Noy (2004).
22It would be much diﬃcult to do this in the three stage least square estimation as
the real exchange rate devaluation and the interaction term between the real devaluation
and the external debt are treated as diﬀerent endogenous variable to avoid the forbidden
regression problem (see Wooldridge (2002)).
17∂∆Yj
∂∆Ej
= α1 + α2(DEBTj) (3)
Now, when dealing with interactions eﬀects, the standard inference analysis
must be slightly adjusted. The coeﬃcient associated with the real exchange
rate in table 4, and its signiﬁcance level, reﬂect the eﬀects of the real exchange
rate on output when the level of external debt is equal to zero. Therefore,
when the level of external debt is equal to zero, the devaluation is expan-
sionary. In order to obtain the signiﬁcance levels for other levels of foreign
debt I follow Aiken and West (1991). In particular, I create a new variable
DEBT(Z) by subtracting from DEBT the value of net foreign debt to GDP,
Z. I generate a new interaction eﬀect between the real exchange rate deval-
uation and the new level of indebtedness (DEBT(Z)). Next, I run the same
regressions as in table 4 using DEBT(Z) and the new interaction eﬀect. The
signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient associated to the real exchange rate in




= α1 + α2(DEBT(Z))
I provide the elasticity of output to changes in the real exchange rate for
diﬀerent levels of foreign debt and their signiﬁcance levels in the table 9 .
The results indicate that for countries with level of external debt, adjusted by
the fraction of this that is denominated in terms of foreign currency, higher
than 54%, the devaluations tend to be contractionary. For levels of external
debt lower than 6% of GDP, the real devaluation is expansionary.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Recent theoretical studies have challenged the alleged autonomy of monetary
policy delivered by ﬂexible exchange rates. In a scenario in which debts are
18high and denominated in terms of a foreign currency, the conventional wis-
dom, ﬂexible rate perform better than ﬁxed rates when dealing with external
shocks, do not hold. In this context, by reducing net worth, a devaluation
has negative eﬀects on investment and through this on aggregate demand
and employment. Recently, Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2003, 2004) have
shown that the Mundell-Fleming logic still operates as long as ﬁnancial mar-
kets are not too underdeveloped and the level of indebtedness is not too
high.
In this paper I have empirically addressed the eﬀects of real exchange
rate devaluations on output performance. Using a sample of large devalua-
tion episodes for a group of emerging and developed countries I have studied
the evolution of GDP growth during the ﬁrst two years after the devalua-
tion. My results indicate that balance sheet eﬀects have indeed a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on output. Nevertheless, I also ﬁnd evidence for the existence
of a positive eﬀect of the real devaluation on output associated to the tradi-
tional expansionary eﬀect of the devaluation. This expansionary eﬀect is less
important to explain the evolution of output during the ﬁrst year after the
devaluation while it is a signiﬁcant determinant of output growth during the
second year following the devaluation. Adding up these two eﬀects, I found
that for countries with signiﬁcantly high levels of external indebtedness, real
devaluations tend to be contractionary in terms of output during the ﬁrst and
second years after the devaluation. I have also found that the deepness of
the ﬁnancial markets is an important determinant of the evolution of output
after such devaluation. In particular, countries with deeper ﬁnancial market
experience lower output losses following a devaluation.
Finally, the results here presented indicate that policy makers in countries
with external borrowing in foreign currency may face a policy dilemma. If
they allow the exchange rate to depreciate, they are likely to suﬀer signiﬁcant
output losses in the short-run. Nevertheless, it is also likely that the real
depreciation will generate a positive eﬀect on output in the medium term.
19A Appendix
A.1 Data sources and deﬁnitions
GDP Total: Average annual output growth, with respect to its trend
growth, during the ﬁrst and second years following the initial deval-
uation. The trend growth rate of output corresponds to the average
growth previous to the devaluation. Source: World Development Indi-
cators.
GDP Year 1: Average annual output growth, with respect to its trend
growth, during the ﬁrst year following the initial devaluation. The
trend growth rate of output corresponds to the average growth previous
to the devaluation. Source: World Development Indicators.
GDP Year 2: Average annual output growth, with respect to its trend
growth, during the second year following the initial devaluation. The
trend growth rate of output corresponds to the average growth previous
to the devaluation. Source: World Development Indicators.
Real Devaluation: Annual change of the real exchange rate constructed
as the nominal exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar times the
ratio of the U.S. CPI index relative to the domestic CPI index. Sources:
IFS and World Development Indicators.
Real Eﬀective Devaluation: Annual change of the real eﬀective exchange
rate index. Real eﬀective exchange rate is the nominal eﬀective ex-
change rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted
average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deﬂator or in-
dex of costs. The weights reﬂect the relative importance of each of the
other countries in trade ﬂows. Sources: World Development Indicators
and IMF.
External Debt: Total external debt is debt owed to nonresidents repayable
in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum
of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term
debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. External debt for de-
veloped countries is deﬁned as debt securities liabilities and other in-
vestment liabilities minus debt securities assets and other investment
20assets. Sources: World Development Indicators, IMF-BIS Database
and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
Rule of Law: Law and order tradition index. Source: International Coun-
try Risk.
Domestic Credit: Domestic credit provided to private sector. Source:
World Development Indicators.
Terms of Trade Change: Annual change of the terms of trade in goods.
Sources: WEO and World Development Indicators.
Commercial Partners Growth: Weighted average growth of commercial
partners. The weights for each country correspond to the participation
of exports in total. Source: World Development Indicators and Trade
Statistics (IMF).
World Real Interest Rate: USA real interest rate. The real interest rate
is the deposit interest rate less the rate of inﬂation measured by the
GDP deﬂator. Source: World Development Indicators.
Openness: Exports plus imports of goods and services as a ratio GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators.
Change Capital Flows: Annual change of private capital ﬂows (net) to
GDP. Source: WEO.
Original Sin: One minus the ratio between the stock of international se-
curities issued by a country in its own currency and the total stock of
international securities issued by the country. Source: Hausmann and
Panizza (2002)
Dollarization:F r a c t i o no fl o a n sprovided by the ﬁnancial sector denom-
inated in foreign currency in the year previous to the devaluation.
Sources: Arteta (2003), Savastano (1992 and 1996), Barajas and Morales
(2003) and central banks bulletins.
21A.2 Episodes
Country Date Country Date
Argentina 1981Q2 Guatemala 1986Q2
Argentina 1987Q1 Guatemala 1989Q4
Argentina 2002Q1 Iceland 1993Q2
Australia 1985Q1 Indonesia 1983Q2
Australia 1997Q4 Indonesia 1997Q3
Austria 1981Q2 Ireland 1981Q2
Belgium 1981Q2 Ireland 1993Q2
Bolivia 1982Q1 Israel 1983Q4
Brazil 1983Q1 Israel 1989Q1
Brazil 1999Q1 Italy 1981Q2
Bulgaria 1996Q2 Italy 1992Q4
Cameroon 1994Q1 Jamaica 1983Q4
Chile 1982Q2 Japan 1996Q1
Colombia 1997Q3 South Korea 1980Q1
Costa Rica 1981Q1 South Korea 1997Q4
Costa Rica 1991Q1 Macedonia, FYR 1997Q3
Czech Republic 1997Q2 Malaysia 1997Q3
Denmark 1981Q2 Mauritius 1979Q4
Dominican Republic 1985Q1 Mexico 1982Q1
Dominican Republic 1990Q3 Mexico 1985Q3
Ecuador 1982Q2 Mexico 1994Q4
Ecuador 1985Q4 Netherlands 1981Q2
Ecuador 1999Q1 New Zealand 1997Q4
Finland 1981Q2 Norway 1981Q2
Finland 1992Q4 Norway 1992Q4
France 1981Q2 Papua New Guinea 1994Q4
Germany 1981Q2 Papua New Guinea 1997Q4
















Trinidad and Tobago 1985Q4
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28Dependent Variable: GDP Total (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6)
Real Devaluation 0.011 0.021 0.007
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
Real Effective Devaluation 0.035 0.026 0.033
(0.053) (0.055) (0.053)
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) -0.096 -0.114 -0.089
(0.046)** (0.047)** (0.045)*
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) -0.193 -0.183 -0.186
(0.094)** (0.102)* (0.092)**
Rule of Law 0.044 0.048 0.052 0.055
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
Domestic Credit/GDP 0.014 0.010
(0.010) (0.011)
Terms of Trade Change 0.093 0.089 0.095 0.074 0.071 0.077
(0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)** (0.031)** (0.030)**
Commercial Partners Growth 0.681 0.521 0.685 0.641 0.465 0.648
(0.184)*** (0.188)*** (0.191)*** (0.189)*** (0.200)** (0.205)***
World Real Interest Rate -0.303 -0.306 -0.261 -0.420 -0.435 -0.385
(0.128)** (0.144)** (0.145)* (0.123)*** (0.143)*** (0.139)***
Openness -0.007 -0.005
(0.011) (0.012)
Change Capital Flows/GDP (-1) 0.071 0.056
(0.114) (0.117)
No. Observations 82 82 82 76 76 76
R2 0.42 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.37 0.47
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Table 1
Output Losses Dependent Variable: GDP Total (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6)
Real Devaluation 0.016 0.019 0.028
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Real Effective Devaluation 0.142 0.192 0.160
(0.060)** (0.072)*** (0.065)**
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) -0.173 -0.196 -0.183
(0.044)*** (0.046)*** (0.045)***
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) -0.490 -0.634 -0.498
(0.108)*** (0.134)*** (0.113)***
Rule of Law 0.040 0.035 0.046 0.049
(0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Domestic Credit/GDP 0.010 -0.006
(0.009) (0.011)
Terms of Trade Change 0.092 0.089 0.073 0.089 0.094 0.095
(0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.030)*** (0.035)*** (0.030)***
Commercial Partners Growth 0.748 0.616 0.696 0.638 0.457 0.631
(0.167)*** (0.167)*** (0.163)*** (0.189)*** (0.210)** (0.188)***
World Real Interest Rate -0.302 -0.304 -0.349 -0.533 -0.609 -0.481
(0.176)* (0.186)* (0.180)* (0.193)*** (0.223)*** (0.197)**
Openness -0.001 -0.001
(0.011) (0.012)
Change Capital Flows/GDP (-1) 0.052 0.045
(0.069) (0.080)
No. Observations 80 80 76 75 75 75
R2 0.38 0.29 0.43 0.25 -0.06 0.29
Three-stage least squares estimation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Table 2
Output Losses Dependent Variable: GDP Total (3.1) (3.2)
Real Devaluation 0.024
(0.028)
Real Effective Devaluation 0.143
(0.060)**
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.189
(0.045)***
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.501
(0.108)***
Rule of Law 0.041 0.052
(0.014)*** (0.015)***
Terms of Trade Change 0.091 0.081
(0.027)*** (0.029)***
Commercial Partners Growth 0.755 0.587
(0.171)*** (0.188)***
World Real Interest Rate -0.294 -0.494
(0.177)* (0.187)***
No. Observations 76 71
R2 0.39 0.33
Three-stage least squares estimation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Table 3
Output Losses Dependent Variable:
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5)
1 (4.6)
1
Real Devaluation -0.032 0.071 0.060
(0.043) (0.035)** (0.032)*
Real Effective Devaluation 0.088 0.206 0.131
(0.082) (0.075)*** (0.071)*
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.118 -0.225 -0.181
(0.068)* (0.057)*** (0.041)***
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.514 -0.501 -0.321
(0.148)*** (0.135)*** (0.135)**
Rule of Law 0.055 0.048 0.030 0.057 0.032 0.058
(0.022)** (0.021)** (0.018)* (0.020)*** (0.019)* (0.022)**
Terms of Trade Change 0.012 -0.015 0.168 0.177 0.160 0.159
(0.042) (0.040) (0.033)*** (0.039)*** (0.040)*** (0.046)***
Commercial Partners Growth 0.913 0.618 0.577 0.554 0.575 0.608
(0.267)*** (0.256)** (0.215)*** (0.252)** (0.227)** (0.269)**
World Real Interest Rate 0.257 -0.171 -0.844 -0.817 -0.831 -0.772
(0.276) (0.255) (0.222)*** (0.251)*** (0.213)*** (0.183)***
No. Observations 76 71 76 71 78 72
R2 0.16 0.14 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.42
Three-stage least squares estimation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
(1): OLS estimation.
GDP Year 2 GDP Year 1
Table 4
Output Losses Dependent Variable:
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5)
1 (5.6)
1
Real Devaluation 0.015 -0.052 0.063
(0.032) (0.050) (0.031)**
Real Effective Devaluation 0.103 0.033 0.163
(0.061)* (0.089) (0.076)**
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.164 -0.073 -0.183
(0.054)*** (0.083) (0.044)***
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.404 -0.400 -0.367
(0.112)*** (0.163)** (0.144)**
Rule of Law 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.026 0.046
(0.018)** (0.020)** (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.031)
Terms of Trade Change 0.099 0.086 -0.002 -0.033 0.184 0.192
(0.032)*** (0.033)*** (0.051) (0.049) (0.043)*** (0.050)***
Commercial Partners Growth 0.807 0.632 1.026 0.672 0.590 0.643
(0.191)*** (0.206)*** (0.307)*** (0.300)** (0.253)** (0.307)**
World Real Interest Rate -0.415 -0.857 0.433 -0.203 -1.321 -1.420
(0.305) (0.307)*** (0.488) (0.448) (0.417)*** (0.381)***
No. Observations 55 50 55 50 57 51
R2 0.39 0.39 0.11 0.10 0.51 0.49
Three-stage least squares estimation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
(1): OLS estimation.
Regressions excluding European countries.
GDP Total GDP Year 1 GDP Year 2
Table 5
Output Losses Dependent Variable:
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5)
1 (6.6)
1
Real Devaluation 0.070 0.044 0.114
(0.036)* (0.057) (0.055)**
Real Effective Devaluation 0.141 0.105 0.190
(0.066)** (0.099) (0.089)**
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.200 -0.152 -0.287
(0.057)*** (0.088)* (0.079)***
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.387 -0.311 -0.437
(0.119)*** (0.179)* (0.162)**
Rule of Law 0.017 0.043 0.023 0.043 0.006 0.039
(0.018) (0.018)** (0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025)
Terms of Trade Change 0.148 0.154 0.000 0.006 0.241 0.235
(0.055)*** (0.061)** (0.087) (0.091) (0.087)*** (0.102)**
Commercial Partners Growth 0.274 0.322 0.567 0.621 0.137 0.269
(0.259) (0.278) (0.411) (0.418) (0.376) (0.441)
World Real Interest Rate -0.756 -0.681 -0.428 -0.381 -1.042 -0.967
(0.238)*** (0.246)*** (0.379) (0.369) (0.318)*** (0.321)***
Dollarization -0.044 -0.026 -0.118 -0.102 0.037 0.031
(0.029) (0.032) (0.046)** (0.048)** (0.041) (0.046)
No. Observations 41 41 41 41 42 42
R2 0.65 0.59 0.43 0.44 0.61 0.54
Three-stage least squares estimation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
(1): OLS estimation.
GDP Total GDP Year 1 GDP Year 2
Table 6
Output Losses Dependent Variable:
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5)
1 (7.6)
1
Real Devaluation 0.004 -0.047 0.050
(0.027) (0.043) (0.032)
Real Effective Devaluation 0.114 0.032 0.109
(0.059)* (0.083) (0.078)
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.155 -0.085 -0.169
(0.043)*** (0.068) (0.039)***
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.456 -0.407 -0.282
(0.109)*** (0.151)*** (0.148)*
Rule of Law 0.041 0.058 0.061 0.061 0.025 0.053
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.024)** (0.022)*** (0.017) (0.022)**
Terms of Trade Change 0.084 0.065 0.001 -0.041 0.158 0.158
(0.025)*** (0.028)** (0.042) (0.038) (0.040)*** (0.046)***
Commercial Partners Growth 0.927 0.737 1.059 0.673 0.769 0.869
(0.181)*** (0.204)*** (0.300)*** (0.281)** (0.243)*** (0.299)***
World Real Interest Rate -0.308 -0.582 0.260 -0.269 -0.870 -0.814
(0.176)* (0.186)*** (0.291) (0.255) (0.232)*** (0.196)***
No. Observations 64 59 64 59 66 60
R2 0.43 0.33 0.14 0.17 0.53 0.48
Three-stage least squares estimation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
(1): OLS estimation.
Excluding de jure flexible exchange rate regimes
GDP Total GDP Year 1 GDP Year 2
Table 7
Output Losses Dependent Variable:
(8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5)
1 (8.6)
1
Real Devaluation 0.007 -0.033 0.037
(0.030) (0.047) (0.023)*
Real Effective Devaluation 0.108 0.033 0.119
(0.062)* (0.089) (0.061)*
(Real Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.183 -0.103 -0.181
(0.045)*** (0.069) (0.038)***
(Real Effective Devaluation) x (External Debt/GDP) x (Original Sin) -0.486 -0.479 -0.376
(0.105)*** (0.151)*** (0.125)***
Rule of Law 0.042 0.049 0.056 0.041 0.034 0.055
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)** (0.018)* (0.021)**
Terms of Trade Change 0.082 0.066 0.008 -0.030 0.148 0.143
(0.027)*** (0.028)** (0.042) (0.041) (0.040)*** (0.047)***
Commercial Partners Growth 0.809 0.654 0.904 0.657 0.675 0.711
(0.170)*** (0.177)*** (0.269)*** (0.257)** (0.209)*** (0.245)***
World Real Interest Rate -0.215 -0.397 0.195 -0.093 -0.709 -0.703
(0.190) (0.180)** (0.300) (0.261) (0.187)*** (0.183)***
Banking Crisis (-1) -0.014 -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 -0.022 -0.021
(0.007)* (0.007)* (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)** (0.011)**
No. Observations 73 68 73 68 75 69
R2 0.43 0.44 0.13 0.06 0.55 0.51
Three-stage least squares estimation; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
(1): OLS estimation.
GDP Total GDP Year 1 GDP Year 2
Table 8
Output Losses (External Debt/GDP) x 
(Original Sin) Elasticity Std. Error P-Value
115.2% -0.148 0.033 0.00
69.0% -0.065 0.023 0.01
61.0% -0.050 0.022 0.03
54.0% -0.038 0.022 0.10
35.9% -0.005 0.024 0.83
15.0% 0.033 0.028 0.24
10.9% 0.040 0.029 0.17
6.0% 0.049 0.030 0.10
0.0% 0.060 0.032 0.06
-14.5% 0.086 0.036 0.02
Table 9
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